Quine on Ontological Commitment: Do Tables and Chairs Exist?

Quine on Ontological Commitment: Do Tables and Chairs Exist?

Quine on Ontological Commitment: Do Tables and Chairs Exist?

Keywords: ontological commitment, regimentation, paraphrase, indispensability, ontological relativity

Summary. For Quine, what exists (by the lights of a theory) is whatever must be in the range of its quantifiers for the theory to be true. In symbols: if a regimented theory entails ∃x T(x), it is thereby committed to Ts. Fundamental physics contains no predicate Table(x), so it carries no primitive commitment to tables. Yet our best total regimented theory—science as a whole, including measurement talk and the mathematics it indispensably uses—often quantifies over mid-sized objects; then, by Quine’s criterion, tables do exist.

1. Commitment via quantification

Quine’s criterion is spare: to be is to be the value of a bound variable. We assess a theory’s ontology after regimentation into first-order logic, where quantifiers make commitments explicit. If the theory entails ∃x Electron(x), it is committed to electrons; if it yields ¬∃x Pegasus(x), it is not committed to Pegasus.

Two constraints guide assessment:

  • Regimentation. Rewrite claims in a precise logical language to remove ambiguity and idle vocabulary.
  • Holism. Evaluate commitments for the whole best theory—the “web of belief”—not piecemeal sentence by sentence.

2. Why negative existentials don’t commit you to fictions

Ordinary sentences like “Pegasus does not exist” seem to name something they then deny. Quine’s remedy is paraphrase within a regimented idiom: say ¬∃x Pegasus(x). No name, no reference, no commitment. In general, if a statement can be paraphrased so that dubious terms drop from the quantifiers’ range, the corresponding ontological load disappears.

3. Science and the status of tables and chairs

Physics, as physics, does not introduce Table(x). Its ideology concerns fields, particles, symmetries, interactions, and mathematical structure. Hence fundamental physics by itself is not committed to tables or chairs.

But scientific practice is multi-level. Quine asks us to inspect our best total regimented theory:

  • Option A: Keep ordinary objects. If our mature science explicitly quantifies over mid-sized bodies (apparatus, detectors, furniture), then we accept ∃x Table(x) and incur commitment to tables.
  • Option B: Paraphrase macro-talk. One may replace “There is a table” with “There exist simples arranged tablewise,” e.g. ∃x\,(Simples(x)\,\&\,Arranged\!-\!Tablewise(x)). This still quantifies over composites or sets of simples; to avoid those entirely requires a stronger thesis (e.g. mereological nihilism), which is not Quine’s own view.

Quine’s naturalism and pragmatism make him tolerant of ordinary objects: if countenancing tables yields a simpler, stronger, more predictive total science—including how we describe experiments—then tables belong to what there is, according to that theory.

4. Mathematics and indispensability

Quine’s indispensability line is austere: our best science indispensably employs mathematics; after regimentation, the quantifiers range over mathematical entities (typically sets). Therefore, if we accept the science, we are likewise committed to the mathematics it quantifies over. Ontology thus usually includes both physical objects and sets.

5. Ontological relativity (without triviality)

Later Quine stresses ontological relativity: reference is scheme-relative; multiple equally good assignments of referents may conserve all observable success. This is not deflationary. Within a chosen language and background theory, quantifiers still fix commitments. Across equally adequate schemes, commitments may vary while empirical adequacy remains.

6. What should a natural scientist say?

  • Fundamental physics has no primitive predicate for tables; it is not by itself committed to them.
  • Our total scientific practice—measurement reports, laboratory descriptions, statistical modeling, and mathematics—often quantifies over mid-sized objects. Then tables and chairs exist, by Quine’s criterion.
  • Paraphrase can shrink commitments only if the resulting total theory preserves or improves simplicity, strength, and predictive success.

7. Take-aways

  • Commitment attaches to theories, not words.
  • To be (Quine-style) is to be a value of a bound variable in our best, regimented total science.
  • Physics lacks Table(x); yet our total theory may still quantify over tables—hence count them as real.
  • Paraphrase is legitimate when it improves the total theory by scientific standards, not merely to dodge ontology.

Further reading: W. V. O. Quine, “On What There Is” (1948) and From a Logical Point of View; “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951); Word and Object (1960); “Ontological Relativity” (1969). These introduce the criterion of ontological commitment, the role of regimentation, and the scheme-relativity of reference.

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